EDITOR’S NOTE
I begin this brief note with this announcement: hereafter, and after 18
¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŘŖŗşȱ ǰȱ ȱ
ȱȱ¢ǯ Beginning with the maiden volume in 2001, we
had established an easily accessible website that is a repository for all
hitherto published materials. This is the link: ǱȦȦǯ
ǯȦȦ
Most observers acknowledge seismic changes are now underway in
the Horn of Africa. As a result of the unexpected rise of a new Ethiopian prime minister, Abiy Ahmed Ali, from the Oromo ethnic group,
a novel and breathtaking vision is swirling in the region. This surging
paradigmatic shift is already impacting both the Ethiopian domestic
and regional political topographies. In the case of the first, dramatic
and positive changes in the relationship between the Ethiopian state
and its richly diverse citizenry is unfolding. Among the most significant are: (a) the selection of an Oromo person to head the government
for the first time in the history of modern Ethiopia, (b) the appointment
of women to half of his cabinet, (c) a new and fresh invitation for the
resistant Amhara community to reenter peaceful and civic national
politics, (d) the immediate release of notable political prisoners, (e) a
reassertion of popular participation and freedom of expression, and
(f) an overall re-energizing of democratic governance. On the wider
regional front, the implications are even more notable. First, a daring
breakthrough with regard to the long, bitter, and violent stalemate
between Ethiopia and Eritrea has been swiftly promulgated. In this
context, a satisfactory settlement over the contentious border between
the two countries is now ushering an unconstrained travel and trade
between the two peoples. Second, the Prime Minister and the longserving and authoritarian President of Eritrea, Isaias Afwerki, have
publically stated that the two countries will support the integrity of the
sovereignty of Somalia. Third, Mr. Ahmed has underscored the urge to
move the Horn of Africa towards a larger and more integrated developmental agenda. Add these together, and more, the new initiatives
are not only exhilarating but, more importantly and if made to bear
fruit, could transform the region from its current profile as the epitome
of ubiquitous hunger, disease, ignorance, insecurity, malignant sectarianism, and vulnerability to old and new outside manipulations, to
one of rising quality of wellbeing, collective confidence, and emerging
ǯȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȰȱ ȱ
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triggered potentially colossal changes that are at once worth encouraging and watching with great interest.
Another historic happening took place in the Republic of Somaliland: the successful national presidential election of November 2017.
ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȰ
i.e. Wadani, Ucid, and the ruling KulmiyeȰȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭ
delayed presidency of the country. Notwithstanding a heavy and
regressive dose of tribalist small-mindedness, particularly by Wadani
and Kulmiye, the nearly month-long campaign was generally vibrant
and peaceful. Furthermore, when polling day arrived, the country was
calm and the process concluded with impressive orderliness. Kulmiye
won decisively, by over eighty thousand votes (around 54% of the total)
beyond its closest and major competitor Wadani. During the immediate
aftermath, the leadership of Wadani had expressed bitter concern over
the voting process and accused it of electoral fraudulence, as well as
pointed out what they believed to be an illegitimate and blatant use of
the financial and other assets of the state, to secure Kulmiye’s victory.
However, the numerous international monitors on the ground unanimously certified that, though the contest was fierce, overall the election
was quite fair and free.
There is no question that the consummation of the presidential election in Somaliland, the third nation-wide of its type since the rebirth
of the country in 1991, has marked its politics distinctly from that of
ǯȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȰǯǯȱ
ȱǰȱȱȰȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱ
great divergence include Somaliland’s relative civic cohesiveness, its
working national political institutions, and its professional and able
security forces. In comparison, Somalia continues to be bedeviled by
a toxic cocktail of tribalized zones, self-seeking individualism, fissiparous identity politics, corruption as a way of life among the lumpen
elite, and direct and dark financial interventions by foreign countries,
particularly from the Middle East, in search of compradors. This condition, now entering its third decade, gives the lie to the claim of the
existence of an effective government in Somalia. On the contrary, the
writ of Mogadishu is not uncontestably enforceable in the whole of
the capital, let alone maintaining law and order across the width and
breadth of Somalia. More pointedly, Al-Shabaab forces are resilient and
continue to be very active, with particularly violent disruptions of
quotidian life in Mogadishu. Such is the condition even after nearly $2
billion of aid, primarily for supporting UNISOM/AMISOM, from the
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United States alone in the past ten years. In short, the fallout from the
total wreckage of the post-colonial Somali state, more than a quarter of
a century ago, still debilitatively haunts the people of Somalia.
*****
But the generalized euphoria that accompanied the electoral success of
Kulmiye in Somaliland about a year ago seems to be short-lived. More
pointedly, that spirit of high expectation, one based on a coast-to-coast
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ Ȱȱ ǰȱ
strengthening civic bonding, stimulating economic growth accompanied by environmental protection, reconstructing educational institutions, addressing the gravity of public health, and reinvigorating
ȱ Ȱȱ £ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
collective descent into what Somalilanders call Amakaag iyo Yaab (i.e.
bewilderment and dismay). This worrisome reaction is building up for
the following (among other) reasons:
• President Bihi is yet to concretize in real time the alluring and
ȱ ȱȱȱ£ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȰȱ
grounded in broad justice, kin and gender equity, and high
ȱ ȱȰȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱ
• The composition of his cabinet contradicts the repetitively
asserted campaign pledge to appoint women and men of the
highest caliber. Moreover, the agreed upon postulate of establishing a maximum limit of twenty ministerial portfolios has
been breached. In fact, Bihi immediately returned to the old and
defective formula of exaggerated appointments (32 ministers
and deputies) and conspicuous communal imbalance that is
exceedingly partial to the kin community in the middle of the
country (22 vs. 10 and only one full minister who is female).
Given the thick rancor surrounding the issue of fairness, it is
seems appropriate to heed this wise insight of Michael Ignetieff:
Interethnic accommodation anywhere depends on equilibrium of
forces. An ethnic minority can live in peace with an ethnic majority, as long as that majority does not use its preponderance to turn
the institutions of the state into an instrument of ethnic favoritism.
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• Bihi has admirably and decisively reduced the venal and
scandalous use of state revenues, particularly by senior officials.
Nevertheless, the effect of the confluence of an absence of
economic growth, rising prices, degrading local currency, and
severe unemployment rate among the youth is a looming and
generalized immiseration. Thus, the majority of the denizens of
Somaliland are increasingly becoming depraved hovel dwellers.
• Bihi’s administration continues the unsophisticated, ill-planned,
poorly staffed, and niggardly funded approach to international
affairs. This has been the bane of Somaliland’s global relations
since the country’s rebirth twenty-seven and a half years ago.
Despite the mounting and dizzying changes taking place in
the neighborhood and farther-afield, then, Somaliland is stuck at
a sophomoric level in both understanding the complexities of the
search for recognition, as well as taking stock of the strategic
shifts that are in-progress.
• There is no evidence that neither the Ministry of Education nor
the Ministry of Public Health has been, thus far, given the
supreme attention and reform that each needs so desperately.
For it is a common article of faith in the modern world that these
two seminal priorities set the foundation for the production of
high quality human capital.
• The two opposition parties have become feckless and seem
incapable, thus far, of offering an analytical and inspiring civic
critique. Furthermore, the main opposition, Wadani, which
ganered a striking 43 percent of the total vote, is still wailing
over the defeat. More than a year later, Wadani has shown no
ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȰȱȱ
is competent to hold on tightly to its large supporters, restock its
vision for the country, win over more citizens to its side, and
prepare itself for the competitions ahead.
• The long, long overdue parliamentary election, which has been
delayed for over eight years, was marked to take place in March
2019. This will not be possible again. The reasons for this include:
(a) a highly charged dispute over the tenure of the Electoral
Commission such that Wadani believes must be terminated
before any new national elections are to be mounted, (b) Wadani’s
conviction that the majority of the Commission is a disguised
and biased members of Kulmiye and, therefore, a new Commission with equal representation from the three parties must
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be created, and (c) the long-standing disgruntlement by the kin
communities in the western and eastern Somaliland over what
they believe to be a severely lopsided and unacceptable distribution
of parliamentary seats, one that allots 56 out of the total of 82
seats to the kin community in the geographical center of the
country. This impasse, full of murky intrigue, has at least three
immediate and critical ramifications. First, the current Parliament, despite unanimity among Somalilanders that it is functionally comatose, will linger on. Second, Somaliland’s acclaimed
democratic logos and practice will suffer greater devaluation.
This is particularly the case among the members of the international society, more so the European Union, whose material
and moral sympathy for Somaliland has been indispensable.
Third, such a situation will further discount President Bihi’s
declaration that his leadership will be drastically different from
the previous regime in that national elections will be conducted
on the appointed month and year. All in all, then, Somalilanders
will do well to hear and act on these sagacious and highly relevant words from Vico, penned nearly three hundred years ago.
That body politics is most fortunate, indeed, where the rigorous
observance of the law that binds citizens together like the worship
of an unknown god; where communal discipline is maintained
with no less impartiality and firmness than in an army, where no
soldier is allowed to question an order, his only duty being to await
commands alertly and execute them.

Given the preceding and the total dissonance with those who had
voted for all parties with high hopes, Somaliland seems to be, as it
were, “snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.” Combined, the
above concerns, unless attended with alacrity and haste, are bound to
corrode collective phronesis. Such, in the end, is the critical difference
 ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃ¢ȄȰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱȱȱ Ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ
deliberately made within. On the whole then, 2019 is likely to be a year
of big stakes and heightened anxieties.
*****
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Lastly, I share two pieces of good news. First, the fortieth anniversary
of the Somali Studies International Congress was successfully convened in Hargeisa in the summer of 2018 and hosted by the Hargeisa
Cultural Center and the University of Hargeisa. Second, we welcome
Dr. Jama Muse Jama as a new member of the International Advisory
Board of Bildhaan. Dr. Jama is the founding Director of the Hargeisa
Cultural Center. This is a permanent regional hub that runs research
and cultural programs, including an annual Book Fair that is now in
its eleventh year. Dr. Jama has earned a BA degree in mathematics at
Somali National University, an MA at the University of Pisa (Italy),
and a doctorate at Oriental University in Naples, Italy. He was the
Chair of the organizing committee for the 2018 of SSIA. At that time, he
assumed the presidency of the SSIA.
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